Paper Title
Exposure And Verification Of Neighbour Positions And Exhausting Existence From Wireless Ad Hoc Net Work
Abstract
we address this open issue by proposing a fully dispersed cooperative solution that is robust against independent
and colluding adversaries, and can be impair only by an overwhelming presence of adversaries. Results show that our
protocol can thwart more than 99 percent of the attacks under the best possible conditions for the adversaries, with smallest
false positive rates. These “Vampire” attacks are not specific to any specific protocol, but rather rely on the properties of
many accepted classes of steering protocols. We find that all examined protocols are weak to Vampire attacks, which are
devastating, hard to notice, and are easy to carry out using as few as one hateful insider sharing only protocol-compliant
messages. In the worst case, a single Vampire can increase network-wide energy custom by a factor of O(N), where N in the
number of network nodes. We discuss methods to alleviate these types of attacks, including a new proof-of-concept protocol
that provably bounds the break caused by Vampires during the packet forwarding phase.